Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle |
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| Authors: | Donald E Campbell Jerry S Kelly |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and the Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA (e-mail: decamp@malthus.morton.wm.edu), US;(2) Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA (e-mail: jskelly@maxwell.syr.edu), US |
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| Abstract: | For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet
principle.
Received: 8 July 1996 / Accepted: 9 June 1997 |
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