首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

国有企业委托代理问题及对策
引用本文:刘志强,王润良,崔志霞. 国有企业委托代理问题及对策[J]. 河北工程大学学报(社会科学版), 2005, 22(4): 16-17
作者姓名:刘志强  王润良  崔志霞
作者单位:河北工程学院,经管学院,河北,邯郸,056038
摘    要:国有企业在进行股份制改造后,就在所有者与经营者之间形成了委托代理关系,即所有者委托经营者为实现所有者的利益而从事某些活动。本文通过分析我国国有企业委托代理链中的各个环节,找出我国国有企业由于存在多级契约安排而引起的多层委托代理问题,从而探讨完善我国公司治理结构的对策及措施。为我国国有企业改革提供有益的理论指导。

关 键 词:国有企业  委托代理链  双向制衡机制
文章编号:1008-9896(2005)04-0016-02
修稿时间:2005-09-06

Principal-agent problems and countermeasures of state-owned enterprises
LIU Zhi-qiang,WANG Run-liang,CUI Zhi-xia. Principal-agent problems and countermeasures of state-owned enterprises[J]. , 2005, 22(4): 16-17
Authors:LIU Zhi-qiang  WANG Run-liang  CUI Zhi-xia
Abstract:Principal-agent relation is formed between owners and operators,after state-owned enterprises are stock rebuilt.That is to say,owners consign operators to engage in some activities,in order to realize owners' interests.This paper finds out multilayer principal-agent problems of state-owned enterprises,which are due to the existence of multilevel contracts.Accordingly,some countermeasures and measures on perfecting corporation management are discussed.Academic guidance is presented to state-owned enterprises' innovation.
Keywords:state-owned enterprises  principal-agent chain  bidirectional controlling balance mechanism
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号