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破产重整机构选任模式的比较研究
引用本文:张世君.破产重整机构选任模式的比较研究[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报,2007(1).
作者姓名:张世君
作者单位:中国社会科学院研究生院 经济法学博士,首都经济贸易大学法学系讲师
摘    要:破产重整是对濒临破产的企业实施拯救并促使其得以复兴的特殊法律制度。债务人重整能否成功与重整机构的选任机制休戚相关。世界各国对该问题的立法设计分为两类,即偏重债务人利益的模式与偏重债权人利益的模式。这两种模式不仅体现出了对债务人、债权人的不同态度,还体现了更深层面的法律价值观的冲突,即效率与公平的冲突。我国的破产立法应妥善处理不同主体间的利益平衡,兼顾效率与公平。

关 键 词:破产重整  重整机构  选任模式

A Study by Comparison of Management Organ in Bankruptcy Reorganization
Zhang Shijun.A Study by Comparison of Management Organ in Bankruptcy Reorganization[J].Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,2007(1).
Authors:Zhang Shijun
Institution:Zhang Shijun
Abstract:Bankruptcy reorganization is a special law procedure , the aim of which is to rescue those enterprises which are on the verge of bankruptcy but have a chance of revival. Whether the debtors can succeed in the reorganization is closely related to the mode of choosing reorganization organ. There are two kinds of legislation in the world:emphasizing particularly on the interest of debtor or that of creditor.The above two modes represent not only the different attitudes towards debtor or creditor, but also reflect the conflict of law's value,namely the conflict between efficiency and justice. The legislation of bankruptcy of China should dispose the interest balance of different subjects properly, and give attention to efficiency and justice evenly.
Keywords:bankruptcy reorganization  reorganization organ  mode of choosing
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