A quantification of lobbying benefits with an application to the common agricultural policy

We employ an empirical general equilibrium model of the CAP to determine which factors and countries would be expected to be opposed to or support reform of the CAP. The objective is to determine who are the “friends” and “enemies” of the CAP. The analysis studies the extent to which lobbying activity by these interested parties could be expected to encourage or discourage internal EU reform of the CAP. Several alternative policies to reform the CAP are evaluated in this manner in order to determine if one or another set of policies has a greater chance of being accepted. Specifically, we study the Uruguay Round Agreement, as well as a number of stated negotiating positions presented during the Round. The result will be a summary assessment of the relative politico-economic acceptability of these reform proposals within the EU. Our results lead to a very simple policy conclusion. Given the set of policy packages considered here, there is little doubt that the EU was most inclined to adopt a proposal incorporating compensation payments. Without further disaggregation of the analysis to identify the United States or Japan, we can only note that such a proposal is also the best as far as overall welfare goes for the rest of the world. Our results confirm the importance of sidepayments in the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement.