| 证券投资基金委托代理关系中的道德风险研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李静.证券投资基金委托代理关系中的道德风险研究[J].重庆交通学院学报(社会科学版),2004,4(4):59-60,63. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李静 |
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| 作者单位： | 郑州大学商学院 河南郑州450001 |
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| 摘 要： | 道德风险是在委托代理关系中产生的,其原因在于委托人和代理人努力目标不一致,信息不对等。探讨在证券投资基金委托代理关系中,基金投资者和基金管理人存在的道德风险成因问题,并设计了防范道德风险的契约模型。
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| 关 键 词： | 道德风险 委托代理 证券投资基金 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-9794(2004)04-0059-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年6月7日 |
Research on Moral Risk Related to Principal and Agent Relationship of Stock Investment Foundation |
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| LI Jing.Research on Moral Risk Related to Principal and Agent Relationship of Stock Investment Foundation[J].Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition),2004,4(4):59-60,63. |
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| Authors: | LI Jing |
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| Abstract: | Moral risk is produced in principal and agent relationship,which results from the discordance of purpose and unequal information between principal and agent.It is focused on the reasons of moral risk problems in principal and agent relationship between investor and foundation manager.A model of contract about how to keep away moral risk is proposed. |
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| Keywords: | ethic risk principal and agent stock investment foundation |
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