| 基于武器装备动员的委托代理问题研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 殷旭东,李东. 基于武器装备动员的委托代理问题研究[J]. 南京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 8(2): 49-52,58 |
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| 作者姓名： | 殷旭东 李东 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京航空航天大学,国防经济与科技研究中心,江苏,南京,210016 |
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| 摘 要： | 与普通企业利润最大化目标不同,基于武器装备动员的生产企业的目标具有多重性。当前武器装备生产企业中相关的制度安排是影响企业效率的主要原因。减少委托代理成本,提高激励水平,是提高武器装备动员体系的效率的有效途径。
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| 关 键 词： | 武器装备动员 委托 代理 信息不对称 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-2129(2006)02-0049-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-11-09 |
Research on the Principal-Agent Problem Based on Weapon Equipment Mobilization |
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| YIN Xu-dong,LI Dong. Research on the Principal-Agent Problem Based on Weapon Equipment Mobilization[J]. Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics(Social Sciences), 2006, 8(2): 49-52,58 |
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| Authors: | YIN Xu-dong LI Dong |
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| Abstract: | Different from common enterprises which try to make a maximum profit,the object of the enterprises that produce weapon equipment is quite multiple.The institutional arrangement in the weapon equipment firms is the main reason that affects the enterprises' efficiency.The countermeasures are to reduce principal-agent cost,and then to improve the efficiency of weapon equipment mobilization system. |
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| Keywords: | weapon equipment mobilization principal agent imperfect information |
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