| 我国地方市场保护的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 董烨然.我国地方市场保护的博弈分析[J].河南科技大学学报(社会科学版),2002,20(1):48-52. |
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| 作者姓名： | 董烨然 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南财经学院,河南郑州,450002 |
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| 摘 要： | 地方保护实质是地区间竞争的一种“囚徒困境”博弈 ,各地采取保护行为是地区间博弈的纳什均衡。导致这种非帕累托均衡的根源是中央政府对地方政府不恰当的约束与激励机制
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| 关 键 词： | 地方市场 市场保护 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-8504(2002)01-0048-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年11月9日 |
An Analysis of the Local Market Protection in China Based on Game Theory |
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| DONG Ye,ran.An Analysis of the Local Market Protection in China Based on Game Theory[J].Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology:Social science,2002,20(1):48-52. |
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| Authors: | DONG Ye ran |
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| Abstract: | The crux of the local market protection is a "prisoners dilemma" game among regional competitions. Market protection is "Nash Equilibrium" in the games. The root of "Non Pareto Equilibrium" is the inappropriate incentive and constraint mechanism that centrial government applies to local governments. |
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| Keywords: | local market market protection game theory |
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