海外子公司职业规划对管理层激励机制的分析——基于不完全信息动态博弈模型

通过建立一个不完全信息动态博弈模型,文章对跨国公司海外子公司职业规划对东道国员工管理层行为的激励作用进行了分析。分析结论包括:公司选择真实暴露还是伪装其类型既依赖于管理层敬业工作带来的利润增加、尽职工作导致的利润损失、停止消极行为而挽回的利润,还依赖于公司伪装成本以及提供职业规划所付出的成本;管理层行为是敬业还是尽职则依赖于管理层的努力成本及悔过成本。该理论模型及其结论与其他学者通过实证研究所获得的结论一致。文章为中国企业跨国经营提出了相应的策略,并且提出,中国政府应制定不同的鼓励和引导政策鼓励人才的储备、培训和交流。

The Incentive Mechanism of Career Plan on Host Country Managers of MNCs: Analysis with a Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

A dynamic game of incomplete information is constructed to analyze the incentive mechanism of career plan on host country managers of MNC.Results explain that whether or not corporations hide their true type depends on the profit addition gained by dedicated managers,profit lost by duteous managers,profit recuperation by managers' stopping negative action,fake cost and career plan cost of corporations.Results also show that managers choose to be devoted or duteous depends on their effort cost and regret cos...