Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms |
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Authors: | Hannu Vartiainen |
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Institution: | 1.Yrj? Jahnsson Foundation,Helsinki,Finland |
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Abstract: | We characterize completely ordinal and onto choice rules that are subgame perfect of Nash equilibrium (SPE) implementable
via randomized mechanisms under strict preferences. The characterization is very operationalizable, and allows us to analyse
SPE implementability of voting rules. We show that no scoring rule is SPE implementable. However, the top-cycle and the uncovered correspondences as well as plurality with runoff and any strongly Condorcet consistent voting rule can be SPE implemented. Therefore our results are favourable to majority based voting rules over scoring rules.
Nevertheless, we show that many interesting Condorcet consistent but not strongly Condorcet consistent rules, such as the
Copeland rule, the Kramer rule and the Simpson rule, cannot be SPE implemented. |
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Keywords: | |
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