Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

Consider an individual whose judgments are always based on a fundamental criterion such as a political ideology or a religious doctrine. In a choice situation, he always prefers any alternative that is compatible with the criterion to any that is not. When individuals are allowed to have preference spaces restricted in this manner, we investigate Arrow-consistent domains. We observe that a diversity of attitudes is essential in order to escape an Arrovian impossibility.This paper received the Kanematsu Fellowship from RIEB, Kobe University in May 2002. We are much indebted to two anonymous referees of this journal, three anonymous referees of the Kanematsu Fellowship, Jun Iritani, William Thomson, and John Weymark for helpful comments. We also thank Takashi Kamihigashi, Tetsuya Kishimoto, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Hiroaki Nagatani, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Koji Shimomura, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Koichi Suga, Makoto Tanaka, Ken Urai, and participants at the Kobe-Osaka Joint Seminar in Mathematical Economics at Osaka University in March 2001, the meeting of the Japanese Economic Association at Hiroshima Syudo University in May 2001, the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society in Kobe in July 2001, the Seventh Decentralization Conference at Waseda University in October 2001, the Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare at Caltech in July 2002 for valuable suggestions. The first version was written while we were graduate students in Economics at Kobe University.

---

Toyotaka Sakai (Corresponding author)Email:

Masaki ShimojiEmail: