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劳动力市场博弈批判
引用本文:范瑞滨.劳动力市场博弈批判[J].贵州工业大学学报(社会科学版),2008(1).
作者姓名:范瑞滨
作者单位:贵州大学管理学院 贵州贵阳
摘    要:简要论述现今流行的劳动力市场博弈模型,进而分析这个模型对招聘中工人占信息优势的假设错误,并通过劳动力的买卖过程和产品生产过程的叙述,证明了在雇佣劳动条件下,无论何种情况,占据信息优势的是资本家而非工人,工人都是先耗费了自己的劳动力才能荻取资本家给予其的报酬。工人群体只有通过联合壮大自己的力量,形成一个无产阶级作为一个力量登上政治舞台,才有可能逐渐获取更多的信息,工人才能获得自己的劳动成果。

关 键 词:劳动力市场  信息优势  无产阶级

A Critique of Labor Market Game
FAN Rui-bin.A Critique of Labor Market Game[J].Journal of Guizhou University of Technology(Social Science Edition),2008(1).
Authors:FAN Rui-bin
Institution:FAN Rui-bin (College of Management; Guizhou University; Guiyang 550006 China);
Abstract:There is a supposition that the labor has information advantage when he applies for the job. This paper analyzes the pattern of labor market game,and proves that it is not the fact by presenting the process of buying and selling labor and the process of product manufacture.It is the capitalist who gets information advantage but not the labor.Because the labor must pay his work before he gets the payment from the capitalist.Hence,there must be a union of labors to become a political power by the style of proletariat to get more information and more force.Labors can get what they deserve only when they overthrow the ruling of the capitalist.
Keywords:labor market  information advantage  proletariat
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