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代理冲突与企业非效率投资行为研究述论
引用本文:董云芝,黄国良.代理冲突与企业非效率投资行为研究述论[J].徐州工程学院学报(社会科学版),2010,25(1):14-20.
作者姓名:董云芝  黄国良
作者单位:中国矿业大学,管理学院,江苏,徐州,221008
基金项目:江苏省高校人文社会科学研究项目,中国矿业大学校科研和教改项目
摘    要:投资决策是公司最重要的财务决策之一。在实践中,由于受到众多因素的影响,投资决策会偏离企业价值最大化的目标。文章从委托代理视角,以股东-经理、股东-债权入和大股东-小股东这三种代理冲突为典型,对国内外有关非效率投资研究的文献进行回顾性评述,进而就该领域未来研究的发展方向提出个人见解。

关 键 词:非效率投资  委托代理  股东-经理冲突  股东-债权人冲突  大股东-小股东冲突

A General Study of Agent Conflict and Inefficient Investment of Enterprises
DONG Yun-zhi,HUANG Guo-liang.A General Study of Agent Conflict and Inefficient Investment of Enterprises[J].Journal of xuzhou Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2010,25(1):14-20.
Authors:DONG Yun-zhi  HUANG Guo-liang
Institution:(School of Management, China University o{ Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221008, Jiangsu,China)
Abstract:Investment decision--making is one of the most important financial decision-making to a company. In practice, owing to various kinds of factors, investment decisions might fail to meet the objective of seeking the biggest gains. From the entrusted agent's point of view, this paper makes a review of the literature about inefficient investment from both home and abroad in terms of three typical agent conflicts: shareholder-manager conflict, shareholder-creditor conflict, and major shareholder-minority shareholder conflict. Furthermore, some future directions of academic study in this field are introduced.
Keywords:inefficient investment  entrusted agent  shareholder-manager conflict  shareholder--credi-tor conflict  major shareholders-minority shareholders conflict
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