LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE |
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| Authors: | KATERINA SHERSTYUK YOAV WACHSMAN GERARD RUSSO |
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| Institution: | Sherstyuk:;Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822. Phone 808-956-7851, Fax 808-956-4347, E-mail Wachsman:;Wall College of Business, Coastal Carolina University, 119 Chanticleer Drive, Conway, SC 29526. Phone 843-349-2683, Fax 843-349-2455, E-mail Russo:;Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822. Phone 808-956-7065, Fax 808-956-4347, E-mail |
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| Abstract: | This is an experimental study in economics of mandated benefits. Most individuals who have health insurance in the United States obtain it through their employer. Some states require employers to provide insurance to certain types of workers. We used an experimental laboratory to investigate possible effects of alternative health insurance regulations on the competitive labor market performance. We found that mandating the insurance for all workers creates labor market distortions, whereas mandating the insurance only for full-time workers leads to a higher coverage than under no mandate, an increased number of part-time workers, but does not necessarily lower market efficiency. ( JEL C92, I18, J2) |
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