新现象学对海德格尔“在世存在”思想的扬弃

在新现象学奠基人施密茨看来,海德格尔在《存在与时间》中的生存论分析是刻画严格主体 性的杰作,然而这种主体性却是被异化的。海德格尔尽管突破了内心世界假说,超越了胡塞尔的主体性,但由于忽略了身体在严格主体性中的基础地位,使在他那里已萌芽的情景存在论终至“扭曲”,错失了凭 切身的“在世存在”(in-der-Welt-sein)奠立一种恰如其分的主体性学说的机遇。新现象学深入探究身体在 “在世存在”中的意义,正式提出一种较为完备的情景存在论学说,并在(身体)情绪震颤的主观事实基础 上提炼出新现象学视域下的“在世存在”即严格主体性。

Being-in-the-World under the Horizon of the New Phenomenology

Hermann Schmitz,founder of newphenomenology,regards Heidegger' sexistential analysisin Sein und Zeitas a masterpiece of strict subjectivity . However,this strict subjectivity there is alienated . Although Heidegger had broken through the″inner world″hypothesis and had thus transcended the subjectivity by Husserl,he overlooked the basis of the strict subjectivity-the″felt-body″( Leib) and eventuallydistorted the situation ontologyin the embryonicstage .As aresult,he missed the opportunity of establishing an appropriate subjectivity theory through literal″being-in-the-world″(in-der-Welt-sein) . The new phenomenology probes into the significance of the″felt-body″in″b eing-in-the-world″and proposes a more organized theory of situation ontology .On the basis of corporal-emotional fact (subjective fact),it also refines″b eing-in-the-world″under the horizon of the new phenomenology,namely the strict subjectivity.