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上市公司高管薪酬与企业分红相关性实证研究
引用本文:周慧琴,肖姗姗.上市公司高管薪酬与企业分红相关性实证研究[J].北京邮电大学学报(北京邮电大学学报),2009,11(1):72-77.
作者姓名:周慧琴  肖姗姗
作者单位:北京邮电大学,经济管理学院,北京,100876
摘    要:通过实证研究的方法,以委托代理理论为依据,分析了高管薪酬与企业分红间的相关关系,并进一步阐述了影响两者相关关系的因素,试图通过一个新的视角来看待委托代理问题。最后得出高管薪酬与企业分红呈阶段性的相关关系,企业利润、现金流和企业规模是影响两者相关关系稳定因素的结论,为公司中股东与经营者之间的委托代理问题的解决提供了对策和意见,为公司治理结构的改善提供了参考。

关 键 词:委托代理理论  高管薪酬  企业分红  监督和激励
收稿时间:2008-12-25

An empirical study on the correlation between executive pay and corporate dividends in listed companies
ZHOU Hui-qin,XIAO Shan-shan.An empirical study on the correlation between executive pay and corporate dividends in listed companies[J].Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition),2009,11(1):72-77.
Authors:ZHOU Hui-qin  XIAO Shan-shan
Institution:School of Economics and Management, BUPT
Abstract:Executive pay and corporate dividends policy are topics that attract considerable public concern. They are also hotspots of theoretical research. This article analyzes the correlation between executive pay and corporate dividends, and then analyzes the factors that have impact on the relationship of executive pay and corporate dividend based on the principal-agent theory and by empirical research method. The conclusion is that executive pay and corporate dividend show staging correlation and profits, cash flows and the size of the company have a stable influence on the relationship of the two. This article attempts to adopt a new perspective to the principal-agent problem and provides a solution to improve corporate governance structure.
Keywords:principal-agent theory  executive pay  corporate dividends  supervision and encouragement
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