| 基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘惠萍,张世英.基于声誉理论的我国经理人动态激励模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(4):78-86. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘惠萍 张世英 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院, 天津, 300072;2. 山东经济学院, 山东, 济南, 250014 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文基于声誉理论,建立了一个关于经理人声誉机制与显性机制相结合的最优动态契约模型,以形成长期激励与短期激励相结合的激励模式,根据分析得出了实现声誉有效激励的条件和提高声誉激励效应的途径,并与没有引入声誉机制的契约模型进行了比较,通过实例验证了声誉机制与显性机制相结合的最优动态契约模型的合理性,对于如何有效地发挥声誉机制对我国经理人的激励作用提出了一些建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 声誉机制 显性激励机制 最优动态契约模型 经理人 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-207(2005)04-0078-09 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-11-12; |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年11月12 |
A Study on the Dynamic Incentive Model of Chinese Managers Based on Reputation Theory |
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| LIU Hui-ping,ZHANG Shi-ying.A Study on the Dynamic Incentive Model of Chinese Managers Based on Reputation Theory[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2005,13(4):78-86. |
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| Authors: | LIU Hui-ping ZHANG Shi-ying |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;2. Shandong Economic University, Jinan 250014, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on reputation theory,a model of optimal dynamic incentive contract,which combines reputation mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism for managers,is established.Conditions of achieving effective reputation incentive and ways to enhancing incentive effect are pointed out.Furthermore,this model is compared with a model of explicit incentive contract without reputation mechanism and its rationality is validated by an example.Last,suggestions about how to bring reputation mechanism into play for motivating managers of China are made. |
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| Keywords: | reputation mechanism explicit incentive mechanism the model of optimal dynamic contract managers |
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