Strategy-proofness,tops-only,and the uniform rule |
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Authors: | Toyotaka Sakai Takuma Wakayama |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Economics,Keio University,Tokyo,Japan;2.Faculty of Economics,Ryukoku University,Kyoto,Japan |
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Abstract: | In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is
implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and
show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain. |
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