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考虑质量失误的供应链博弈模型研究
引用本文:曹柬,杨春节. 考虑质量失误的供应链博弈模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, 14(1): 25-29
作者姓名:曹柬  杨春节
作者单位:1. 浙江工业大学经贸管理学院, 浙江, 杭州, 310032;2. 浙江大学信息学院, 浙江, 杭州, 310027
基金项目:浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(Y04171);浙江省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(NX05GL07);浙江省教育厅科研计划项目(20040580)
摘    要:在理性的制造商和供应商组成的二级供应链中,考虑存在产品质量失误的情况下,通过最优化方法选择中间品的质量水平和制造商的检测水平,以实现供应链的利润最大化.并结合实际情况,根据质量内部、外部失误的不同承担方式,讨论了三种质量损失承担方式,得到在整体损失由两者共同承担的情况下,通过制定合理的内、外部损失分配系数,可以使两者选择水平的纳什均衡解与供应链的全局最优解相符,从而实现供应链全局最优和局部最优的一致.所得结论对指导供应链的有效运作有着较好的实际意义和参考价值.

关 键 词:供应链  非对称信息  质量失误  纳什均衡  效用模型  
文章编号:1003-207(2006)01-0025-05
收稿时间:2005-02-03;
修稿时间:2005-02-03

A Game Analysis on Quality Failure of Supply Chain
CAO Jian,YANG Chun-jie. A Game Analysis on Quality Failure of Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, 14(1): 25-29
Authors:CAO Jian  YANG Chun-jie
Affiliation:1. College of Business & Administration, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310032, China;2. College of Information Science & Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
Abstract:The efficient coordination between one risk neutral supplier and one risk neutral buyer was studied in view of products' quality failure.To maximize the profits of the bi-level supply chain,the proper quality costs of the supplier and the proper appraisal costs of the buyer were determined by the optimization method.Then,combined with the practical operation of supply chain,three kinds of utility models in accordance with how to undertake external and internal quality failure between two members were proposed and analyzed.The results indicate that,by determining the proper external partition coefficient and internal partition coefficient,the global optimization of suplpy chain and the local optimization of each member can be obtained concurrently.The conclusions are significant to guide the contract-making between members in the supply chain.
Keywords:supply chain  asymmetric information  quality failure  Nash equilibrium  utility model  
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