信任、隐性激励与企业知识共享

现有KM研究成果对知识共享激励的研究多数是对传统激励理论的简单移植,主要的激励合约是报酬激励,在个人产出为公开信息的情况下,传统的显性激励对编码化知识共享有效;当团队产出可以观测,但是在团队成员间不可分割时,如果没有额外的激励,显性激励模型达不到帕累托最优。然而,以信任机制为基础的隐性激励下,只要团队成员具有一定的耐心,就会选择共享,而且对于重视知识的知识员工而言,则只需要具有微弱的耐心,隐性契约就可以有效激励其共享。隐性激励而不是以薪酬激励为代表的显性激励是激励知识共享的最优激励契约。

Credit, Hidden Motivation and Knowledge Sharing of Company

Most of KM research of knowledge sharing is the simple replanting of classical incentive theory.Most of motivation contract is reward motivation.This paper establishes an apparent motivation model with the premise under which private outputs is public information,analyzes the validity of such kind of motivation to codified knowledge sharing.Later,this paper puts forward an apparent motivation model with the premise under which team outputs not being divided among team members is public information,argues that this motivation can't be Pareto optimization.Ultimately,this paper establishes a hidden motivation model with credit existed and proves that hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if team members in some extent are patient.As to knowledge workers that pay more attention to their knowledge,hidden contract can inspire sharing motivation efficiently if only they have faint patient.Reasoned ring upon ring,this paper gets the conclusion that hidden contract but not apparent contract such as reward contract is the optimal motivation contract to inspire knowledge sharing.