标准成本内部定价、可比绩效与动态激励

以标准成本作为公司内部交易的转移价格,上游卖方部门预期到下期采用的标准成本可能会随上期实现的实际成本的减少而减少。转移价格随之要下降,上游缺乏控制成本的激励,棘轮效应产生。为抑制该问题,引入可比绩效,构建两阶段动态激励模型,分析发现:在形成第二阶段预期时,可比绩效信息如果导致第一阶段实现的成本上被赋予的权数减少,引入可比绩效信息会弱化棘轮效应;如果导致被赋予的权数增加,引入可比绩效信息则会强化棘轮效应。

Internal Pricing Based on Standard Cost,Comparative Performance and Dynamic Incentives

Standard cost is commonly used as transfer price of inside trade in a company when market price is absent. When upstream sellers predict that standard cost of next period may decrease due to decline of actual cost of prior period and subsequently,transfer price may decline,they will not have motivation to control cost. This is why ratchet effect occurs. To address this problem,this paper designs a2-stage dynamic incentive model. It shows that ratchet effects would be thwarted after comparative performance information being introduced if the weight on the realized cost of first stage decreases while expectation about cost of second stage is forming. Otherwise,it would be strengthened.