两权分离下的异地独立董事聘任

本文以2001-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了控股股东控制权与现金流权分离对公司聘任异地独立董事的影响。研究发现:(1)两权分离度越高的公司,越倾向于聘任异地独立董事,该结论在控制了内生性问题后仍然成立;(2)聘任异地独立董事的后果在于:两权分离度越高,公司聘任的异地独立董事越多,其对公司价值的损害也越大;(3)异地独立董事是大股东直接控制董事会的替代选择,在大股东委派董事会重要职位的公司中,两权分离对异地独立董事的影响相对更弱;进一步分析表明,机构投资者对两权分离增加而增加聘任异地独董的效应具有显著抑制作用。本文的结论表明聘请异地独董是大股东实现掏空的重要机制,以此拓展和丰富了两权分离如何影响董事会治理的研究,也为优化独立董事履职机制提供了参考。

The Appointment of Non-local Independent Directors in the Circumstance Where Control Is Separated from Ownership

By employing sample of listed companies on Chinese main board from 2001-2013,this study explores how the appointment of nonlocal independent directors will be affected by the separation of controlling shareholders’ control right and cash flow right. We find,firstly,the higher the separation is,the more nonlocal independent directors the firm would appoint,and the result is robust after controlling multiple endogenous problems;secondly,the consequence of appointing nonlocal independent directors is that when the separation is high,the more nonlocal independent directors a firm hires,the severer the negative effect those directors will exert on the firm’s value;moreover,when the large shareholders cannot directly control the board,hiring nonlocal independent directors is an alternative way to do it,meaning in the firms whose important positions of the board are appointed by the large shareholders,the impact that the separation exerts on hiring nonlocal directors is weaker. Additional test shows that,institutions attenuate the effect that the higher the separation is,the more nonlocal independent directors will be enrolled. The results of this study show that hiring nonlocal independent directors is an important way to realize the tunneling behavior of large shareholders,therefore this study not only extends and enriches the researches on how does the separation influence the governance role of the board,but also offers some enlightenments on how to improve the effect of independent directors’ performance.