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企业国有资产流失的博弈模型分析
引用本文:朱顺泉.企业国有资产流失的博弈模型分析[J].重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版),2004,21(2):4-6.
作者姓名:朱顺泉
作者单位:暨南大学,管理学院,广州,510632
摘    要:目前我国在资产权益与收益方面的博弈总体上是处在国家所有者的低级有规则合作与企业经营者的低级无规则合作博弈向前者的中级有规则合作与后者低级有规则合作博弈转轨时期,即由LRCG对LICG博弈格局向MRCG与LRCG博弈格局的转轨时期,在这种博弈格局中存在着不对称博弈规则,这种不对称博弈规则是导致国有资产流失的一个重要原因.

关 键 词:国有资产流失  博弈论  纳什均衡  博弈效果模型  分析
文章编号:1672-0598(2004)02-0004-03
修稿时间:2003年9月2日

Analysis of asset loss of state-owned enterprises with game model
ZHU Shun-quan.Analysis of asset loss of state-owned enterprises with game model[J].Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University Social Science Edition,2004,21(2):4-6.
Authors:ZHU Shun-quan
Abstract:The games of legal rights of asset and gain are in the shifting period that national owners' cooperation with regulations at low levels and the dealers' cooperation without regulations at low levels shift to the formers' cooperation with regulations at medium levels and the latter's cooperation with regulations at low levels, in which there exists asymmetric game regulation. The asymmetric game regulation is the important cause of resulting in asset loss of state-owned enterprises.
Keywords:erosion of state-owned assets  game  Nash equilibrium  game effect model  analysis
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