煤电差价合约及其合作效益优化分配的博弈模型

随着煤炭市场的规模化、集中化的出现,煤炭商利用其市场力哄抬煤炭市场价格的现象自然会出现,而煤炭价格的上涨又会带来发电上网价格、供电销售价格的上涨。可见,控制煤炭商市场力可以从源头有效管理能源价格问题。本文设计了煤电的差价合约模型,然后运用Cournot寡头垄断模型论述差价合约对煤炭商的生产行为与发电商的决策行为的影响,运用Stackelberg寡头垄断模型论述发电商之间合作对其效应的影响,并通过Shapley原理给出了发电商之间合作利益分配模型。通过算例模拟发现,煤电差价合约可以促使煤炭商增加生产量,降低煤炭市场价格,稳定销售量,而发电商的合作行为使这种效应更加明显。

The Contracts for Difference between Coal Producers and Electricity Generators and Its Optimal Cooperation Benefit Distributing Model based on Game Theory

With the emergence of centralized coal market in large scale,the phenomenon that the coal producers raise up coal market price by exerting their market power will appear naturally,which will raise up the electricity price on grid and electricity sale price.So controling the market power of coal producers can manage the energy price from headst ream.The contract for difference between the coal producer and electricity generator is designed,and then the Cour not model is used to analyze the coal producers producing behaviors and the electricity generators decision behaviors,where the Stackelberg model is used to analyze the generators cooperation behavior.Finally the Shapley principle is applied to present the profits distributing model.The simulation results demonstrate that the contract for difference between the coal producers and electricity generators can promote the coal producers out put,reduce the coal market price and steady the sale capacity.This effects will be enhanced by the generators cooperation.