地方政府竞争对土地资源错配的影响研究——基于成渝地区双城经济圈面板数据

成渝地区双城经济圈是我国经济的重要新兴增长极，但其发展相对滞后，经济增长内生动力不足，依靠土地出让的地方政府竞争行为依然普遍存在，不利于土地资源的高效配置。基于政府土地出让视角，构建地方政府博弈模型，选取成渝地区双城经济圈2009—2017年城市面板数据，采用系统GMM的实证研究表明：成渝地区政府竞争与土地资源错配呈现显著的“U”形变化特征，地区经济发展水平是这一影响的重要作用机制；在替换变量和剔除核心城市后，结论依然稳健；此外，由于政府竞争博弈行为的反复特征，土地资源错配程度存在动态循环的正向累积趋势。

Study on the Impact of Local Government Competition on Misallocation of Land Resources: Based on the Panel Data of Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle

The Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle is an important emerging growth pole in China’s economy. However, due to the relatively backward development and insufficient internal economic growth impetus, the competition behavior of local governments based on land transfer still exists widely, which is not conducive to the efficient allocation of land resources. Based on the perspective of government land transfer, a local government game model is constructed. Panel data from cities in the Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle from 2009 to 2017 are selected. Empirical research using the system GMM method indicates that government competition and misallocation of land resources in the Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Circle exhibit a significant “U”-shaped pattern of change, with the level of regional economic development being an important mechanism of this effect. The conclusions remain robust after replacing variables and excluding core cities. Furthermore, due to the repetitive nature of government competition game behavior, there is a dynamic cumulative trend of increasing misallocation of land resources.