Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint |
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Authors: | Paula Jaramillo Ça?atay Kay? Flip Klijn |
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Institution: | 1. Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia 2. Facultad de Economía, Universidad del Rosario, Calle 12C # 4-59 Bogotá, Bogotá, Colombia 3. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain
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Abstract: | We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. |
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