A value for games with coalition structures |
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Authors: | Gérard Hamiache |
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Affiliation: | (1) GREMARS, Université Lille III, Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France;(2) Present address: Université Lille III, UFR de Mathématiques Sciences Économiques et Sociales, Domaine universitaire du Pont de Bois, B.P. 60149, 59653 Villeneuve d’Ascq Cedex, France |
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Abstract: | This paper presents an axiomatization of a value for games with coalition structures which is an alternative to the Owen Value. The motor of this new axiomatization is a consistency axiom based on an associated game, which is not a reduced game. The new value of an n-player unanimity game is the compound average of the new values of all the (n-1)-player unanimity games. The new value of a unanimity game allocates to bigger coalitions a larger share of the total wealth. Note that the Owen value allocates to all the coalitions the same share independently of their size. |
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Keywords: | Owen value Coalition structure Associated game Consistency |
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