| 销售绩效的博弈分析与激励契约 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 冯立超,武志辉,郭小强,郑石秋,刘秋梅. 销售绩效的博弈分析与激励契约[J]. 河北理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2009, 9(5) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 冯立超 武志辉 郭小强 郑石秋 刘秋梅 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 河北理工大学,理学院,河北,唐山,063009
2. 哈尔滨理工大学,应用科学学院,黑龙江,哈尔滨,150080 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 企业销售人员基于自身利益的驱动会产生道德风险行为,道德风险严重地阻碍了企业的发展.运用不完全信息动态博弈理论和委托-代理理论,建立了防范道德风险的博弈模型,定量地讨论了均衡状态下的最优博弈策略,并给出了基于最优博弈策略促使销售人员努力完成销售任务的激励契约.
|
| 关 键 词： | 销售人员 道德风险 博弈策略 委托-代理原理 激励契约 绩效 |
Gambling Analysis and Incentive Contract of Sales Performance |
| |
| FENG Li-chao,WU Zhi-hui,GUO Xiao-qiang,ZHENG Shi-qiu,LIU Qiu-mei. Gambling Analysis and Incentive Contract of Sales Performance[J]. Journal of Hebei Polytechnic University(Social Science Edition), 2009, 9(5) |
| |
| Authors: | FENG Li-chao WU Zhi-hui GUO Xiao-qiang ZHENG Shi-qiu LIU Qiu-mei |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1.College of Science;Hebei Polytechnic University;angshan Hebei 063009;China;2.Appliedences College;Harbin University of Science and Technology;Harbin Heilongjiang 150080;China |
| |
| Abstract: | In corporation,salesman would have the moral hazard behavior in view of his own benefit,and the moral hazard behavior has hindered the development of corporation seriously.Using incomplete information dynamic gamble theory and principal-agent theory,this paper has founded the gambling model which guard against moral hazard,and has discussed optimal gambling strategy under the equilibrium state quantitatively.At last,the incentive contract based on optimal gambling strategy,which urges salesman to finish sal... |
| |
| Keywords: | salespeople moral hazard gambling strategy principal-agent theory incentive contract performance. |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
