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确证悖论的认识论解
引用本文:顿新国. 确证悖论的认识论解[J]. 湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2013, 16(5): 23-26
作者姓名:顿新国
作者单位:南京大学 a.哲学系,b.现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所,江苏 南京 210046
基金项目:国家社科基金项目“归纳悖论与确证逻辑新探”(11BZX061);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目“确证理论及其语用趋向与应用研究”(08JC720006);江苏省社会科学基金项目“形式知识论研究”(10ZXC009)
摘    要:确证悖论的构造过程表明,它本质上是关于信念(假说)合理接受的认识论悖论;对其解悖史的系统考察可揭示各类代表性方案均明显依赖某些认识论因素。在充分挖掘确证悖论之认识论意蕴基础上,可通过修改主流方案所默认的逻辑上的确证等值条件,在认识论上消解确证悖论,并对这一消解给予有力辩护。

关 键 词:确证悖论;认识论;解决方案

An Epistemological Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation
DUN Xin guo. An Epistemological Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation[J]. journal of hunan university of science&technology, 2013, 16(5): 23-26
Authors:DUN Xin guo
Affiliation:Philosophy Department, Institute of Modern Logic and Application, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210046, China
Abstract:By reconstructing the Paradox of Confirmation, it is revealed that the paradox is essentially an epistemic paradox about rational belief or hypothesis acceptance. The history of solution to Paradox of Confirmation shows all the main representative solutions depend on some epistemological factors clearly. After?carefully examining the epistemological implications of the paradox, this paper proposes an epistemological solution to it based on modifying the logical equivalence condition of confirmation, and then the solution is justified convincingly.
Keywords:paradox of confirmation   epistemology   solution
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