| 股权激励实施中经营者信息披露策略的演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 冉茂盛,罗富碧,黄凌云.股权激励实施中经营者信息披露策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2009,23(1):139-142. |
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| 作者姓名： | 冉茂盛 罗富碧 黄凌云 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文在股东与经理仅具有有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈方法对股权激励实施过程中,经理信息披露策略选择与股东策略选择的互动机制进行了分析.结果表明:当经理信息操纵的收益大于信息操纵的成本时,经理的信息披露策略依赖于股东监控的概率大小.当股东监控的收益大于监控的成本时,股东是否监控取决于经理选择信息操纵策略的概率大小.保持适度的股权激励水平、增强资本市场的有效性、加强监管、加重惩罚能降低经理信息操纵的概率.
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| 关 键 词： | 股权激励 信息披露 监控 演化博弈 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Executives' Information Disclosure Based on Stock-based Compensation |
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| Ran Mao-sheng,Luo Fu-bi,Huang Ling-yun.Evolutionary Game Analysis on Executives' Information Disclosure Based on Stock-based Compensation[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2009,23(1):139-142. |
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| Authors: | Ran Mao-sheng Luo Fu-bi Huang Ling-yun |
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| Institution: | College of Economics and Business Administration;Chongqing University;Chongqing 400030;China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,considering that the shareholders and manager are bounded rationality,We analyze the interaction between the executives' information disclosure policy and the shareholders' policy by using evolutionary game theory.The results are: when the gain of information manipulation is larger than the cost,the manager' policy relies on the probability of shareholder' monitor;when the gain of monitor is larger than the cost,whether the shareholders monitor or not decided by the probability of information ... |
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| Keywords: | stock-based compensation information disclosure monitor evolutionary game |
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