转型期地方政府与利益集团的利益博弈关系探析

转型期的地方政府和利益集团，在“经济人”假设中总是追求自身利益的最大化。权力的稀缺性和利益性，利益集团追逐利益的本性，使地方政府与利益集团天生就构成一种联盟关系。在中央政府、地方政府和利益集团三者博弈关系中，中央政府在政策贯彻的执行力度上的强硬程度，影响着地方政府和利益集团联盟关系的“牢固”与否。地方政府与利益集团并非是天然的联盟关系，地方政府往往占据主动权，在不同因素作用下两者之间的博弈关系，是一种脆弱的、缺乏稳定的关系。

An Analysis on the Game Relation of Interests between Local Governments and Interest Groups in the Transition Period

The local governments and interest groups in the transition period are always in pursuit of self-interest maximization when the ＂economic man＂ is assumed. The scarcity and interest of power, and the nature of interest groups running after interests make local governments and interest groups constitute an alliance naturally. In the game relation among central government, local government and interest groups, the strength of central government in the execution of policy affects the alliance between local gov- ernment and interest groups. Actually, the local governments often play the active part in this relationship since their alliance is not natural. Therefore, the game relation between them is fragile and unstable under the effect of different factors.