基于博弈论的均衡股权结构治理模型研究

在中国上市公司股权集中度比较高的前提条件下,人们认为国有股"一股独大"的集中股权结构是治理问题存在的根源,建立均衡的股权结构有利于改善公司治理。本文引入多个大股东均衡治理模型,进行完全信息动态博弈的建模和分析,分析的结论是:在目前的公司治理环境、传统文化背景条件下,均衡的股权结构的治理模式未必优于"一股独大"股权结构治理模式。治理结果取决于大股东之间相互博弈过程中的策略选择,而这些股东之间的策略选择与公司治理环境、传统文化、价值观等有关。最后文章在理论分析的基础上给出了一些结论和建议。

A Research on Corporate Governance Model of Multi-Large Shareholders Based on Game Theory

Under the high concentration degree of stockholders rights,the State-owned stock "a dominant shareholder" is the basic reason of corporate governance,establishesing "several equal-sized shareholders" structure would be advantageous to the improve the corporate governance.This article introduc's many major stockholders model,carries on complete information dynamic game,and obtains the conclusion: "several equal-sized shareholders" structure governance is not the quite ideal governance pattern,at present "a dominant shareholder" governance pattern surpasses the "several equal-sized shareholders" government pattern,the government result is not only the result of these major stockholder s mutual gambling process,but also the result of shareholdefs cultural values.In the final,some conclusions and the suggestions based on the theoretical analysis are given.