Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism |
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Authors: | Amrita Dhillon |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK (Fax: (44)-1-203-523032), GB |
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Abstract: | This paper introduces the “Extended Pareto” axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when
it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy
the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition
of 2 other axioms: “Anonymity” and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: “Weak IIA” it
is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called “Relative Utilitarianism” that consists of normalising individual
utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.
Received: 7 June 1994 / Accepted: 28 April 1997 |
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