论作为方法的明见

胡塞尔的现象学为我们提供了一种什么样的"方法"?它在何种意义上能够使我们获得有关意识生活的真理?本文试图通过对现象学方法论的原则即"明见"(Evidenz)的讨论来回答上述问题。胡塞尔现象学中所谈及的"明见",并不指向保障绝对真理的特殊体验,或是一种私人的、对确定性的感受,而是事物在其中"自身被给予"的体验。胡塞尔将它理解为"通达"(Zugang)意义上的"方法",它是最初通达世界或世界在其中自身敞开及显现的媒介。明见的体验作为通达方法具有"原初的正当性"(Urrecht):在其中,我们"有理由"将世界中的事物看作独立、真实且毫无疑问的存在物。与日常意义上的方法不同,"明见"并不能一劳永逸地将我们带向绝对的真理,但它却是我们不断修正、改进已有的认识并从而更接近真理的唯一"方法"。

Evidenz as a Method

What "method" does Husserl’s phenomenology provide and how can it help us acquire the truth about conscious life? The paper focuses on the answering of the above question through the application of Evidenz.Evidenz in Husserl’s phenomenology does not refer to a special experience of ensuring absolute truth or a private experience of certainty but to a self-given experience of some things.Husserl regards it as a "method" in the frame of Zugang,a medium for getting access to the world or a representation of the world.The experience of Evidenz as a means of Zugang has its Urrecht,in which we can regard the things in the world as the real and independent beings.Evidenz cannot lead us to absolute truth once for all but it is the only method that helps us to approach truth.