运气应得与公正

在人类历史上,以应得为基础的公正一直被认为是具有很强说服力的理论。然而,当20世纪70年代末内格尔等人提出道德运气这一概念后,以应得为基础的公正受到了前所未有的挑战。在政治哲学领域表现为精英主义与运气均等主义(Luck Egalitarian)的对抗,而在个人层面的公正尤其是矫正正义方面,应得的公正是否仍然适用于受到运气影响的道德实践是一个亟待探讨的问题。本文试图通过将应得与过错行为建立联系来说明应得的公正应然适合于存在过错行为的运气性后果的损失分担,但是不适用于完全由运气造成的后果的损失分担。

Luck,Desert and Justice

The justice based on desert has been regarded as one of the most persuasive theory throughout the long history of human beings.However,it has been faced with unprecedented challenges since the concept of moral luck was proposed by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams in the late 1970s.The challenge demonstrated itself as the contrast between advocates of meritocracy and the luck egalitarian at the level of political philosophy.At the meantime,whether the justice based on desert in personal justice can still apply to the moral practice where luck is pervasive has become an urgent problem.The purpose of this essay is to argue that the justice based on desert can still be applicable to the bearing of the loss resulted from wrongdoings,but it can never be applicable for the bearing of the loss as a result of complete luck.