地方政府间支出竞争的理论综述

"标尺竞争"理论最初用于规制政府行为的研究领域。随着财政分权的发展,该理论被用来分析地方政府间的竞争行为。与传统的"用脚投票"理论不同,"标尺竞争"着眼于官员行为而非考虑地方福利。用规制理论分析政府官员与选民的关系,为研究地方政府间的相互关系提供了新的视角和解释。此外,众多实证研究也以该理论为出发点诠释地方政府竞争的作用及影响。本文从标尺竞争理论的发展及财政分权框架下地方政府行为的研究入手,梳理解释地方政府间支出竞争的理论和实证研究。

On the Theory of Local Government Expense Competition

Unlike the conventional theory of"voting by foot",the"yardstick competition"theory,which used to be applied to the regulation of the government behaviour and is currently used as a means of analyzing the competitive acts of regional governments,is more focused on the behaviour of government officials than on the interest of the local people.To analyze the relationship between the government officials and the voters using this theory is a fresh perspective in the study of the competitive relationship between governments.The present paper is a theoretical and practical examination of the expense competition among governments from the perspective of the yardstick theory.