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民营企业大股东控制与高管薪酬有效性的实证研究
引用本文:王琦,吴冲.民营企业大股东控制与高管薪酬有效性的实证研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2015,21(5):65-71.
作者姓名:王琦  吴冲
作者单位:哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨,150001
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(71271070);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目资助(NCET-08-0171)
摘    要:选取2008-2012年民营上市公司的经验数据,实证研究大股东控制与高管薪酬有效性的关系问题.研究发现:大股东股权越集中,高管薪酬有效性越强;大股东管理介入度越高,高管薪酬有效性越弱.研究表明,大股东控制会对高管薪酬有效性产生显著影响,并且其抑制作用大于协同作用.研究结论不仅为高管薪酬有效性强弱问题的大股东控制解释提供了充分证据支持,也为民营企业建立合理的高管薪酬机制提供了参考依据.

关 键 词:大股东控制  高管薪酬  民营企业
收稿时间:2015/3/27 0:00:00

An empirical research on the relation between the major shareholder control and the effectiveness of executive compensation in private firms in China
WANG Qi and WU Chong.An empirical research on the relation between the major shareholder control and the effectiveness of executive compensation in private firms in China[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Social Sciences Edition),2015,21(5):65-71.
Authors:WANG Qi and WU Chong
Institution:School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001, P. R. China and School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001, P. R. China
Abstract:This paper empirically researches the relation between the major shareholder control and the effectiveness of executive compensation by using data of private listed companies from 2008 to 2012. This study reveals that the higher the concentration of ownership of the largest shareholder, the greater the effectiveness of executive compensation; the greater the management degree of major shareholder, the smaller the effectiveness of executive compensation. Further we find that the major shareholder control has a significant impact on the effectiveness of executive compensation. The inhibitive effect outweighs the incentive effect. These results provide sufficient evidences to support the major shareholder control explanation for the strength issue of executive compensation effectiveness. The results also can provide references for private enterprises to establish a reasonable executive compensation mechanism.
Keywords:major shareholder control  executive compensation  private enterprise
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