国有企业委托一代理关系的激励机制研究

探讨我国国有企业委托代理关系及激励机制。针对委托人与代理人的利益均可产生影响的事件A(如贪污等)，通过分析委托人的风险回避模型和代理人的期望效用模型得出结论：国家监督职能部门的信息获取能力、信息的有效性、适当成本花费及强有力的惩罚程度有利于委托人的风险回避。将代理人的工资与企业利润挂钩，注重分配代理人长期努力工作的未来收益是减少代理人道德风险行为的有效手段。

Study on the Agency and Incentive Mechanism of State-owned Enterprise

This paper explores the agency and incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises (SOES) by constructing and analysis a moral hazard model and a future utility model. The results sufficient that sufficient, effective information with fairly low cost expense and strong punishment are benefit to evade any hazard for principals. Agents wb have little incentive of moral hazard if the wages are connected wb their enterprise and their future utility are concerned.