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IPO询价机制研究
引用本文:陈妍,胡国生,张跃平.IPO询价机制研究[J].云梦学刊,2007,28(4):72-74.
作者姓名:陈妍  胡国生  张跃平
作者单位:1. 中南民族大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430074;湖南理工学院,数学系,湖南,岳阳,414006
2. 中南民族大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430074
摘    要:根据询价中的价格机制、发行人的目标函数、机构投资者的目标函数显示,IPO公司为达到发行收益最大化的目标。应联合保荐机构在询价过程中采取数量歧视,有效地在机构投资者与二级市场投资者之间分配股票数量。越多的二级市场投资者参与如PO认购,发行人可以通过降低机构投资者的外部选择价值来获取更高收益。

关 键 词:询价机制  数量歧视  外部选择价值
文章编号:1006-6365(2007)04-0072-03
修稿时间:2007年6月10日

STUDY ON IPO INQUIRY MECHANISM
CHEN Yan,HU Guo-sheng,ZHANG Yue-ping.STUDY ON IPO INQUIRY MECHANISM[J].Journal of Yunmeng,2007,28(4):72-74.
Authors:CHEN Yan  HU Guo-sheng  ZHANG Yue-ping
Institution:CHEN Yan, HU Guo-sheng, ZHANG Yue-ping (1. School of Economy, South-Central University For Nationalities, Wuhan Hubei 430074; 2. Department of Mathematics, Hunan Insititute of Science and Technology Yueyang Hunan 414006)
Abstract:On account of the participation of institutional investors with personal information superiority and secondary market investors without information,employs pricing mechanism and the objective functions of seller and institutional investors in the inquiry emission to make a study that an IPO firm should combine with the intermediary to adopt quantity discrimination and effectively allocate the shares among the two categories of investors during the inquiry process to guarantee the maximization of sellers interests,and draws the conclusion that the seller can achieve higher revenues with lager numbers of secondary market investors participating in an IPO,which lower the value of the institutional investors outside option.
Keywords:inquiry mechanism  quantity discrimination  value of outside option
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