| 上市公司会计信息披露监管的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 梅世强,张力. 上市公司会计信息披露监管的博弈分析[J]. 河南科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 24(3): 87-89 |
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| 作者姓名： | 梅世强 张力 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对近几年上市公司发生的多桩财务欺诈案,从监管者和上市公司的利益分布入手进行博弈分析,确定上市公司和监管者的反应函数,建立会计监督博弈模型,并得出结论:监管者提高对上市公司违规处罚力度和随机检查的概率,可使上市公司违规率下降。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 上市公司 均衡概率 会计信息 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-3910(2006)03-0087-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-10-24 |
Aanalysis on Supervision for Listed Companies''''s Financial Information |
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| MEI Shi-qiang,ZHANG Li. Aanalysis on Supervision for Listed Companies''''s Financial Information[J]. Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology:Social science, 2006, 24(3): 87-89 |
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| Authors: | MEI Shi-qiang ZHANG Li |
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| Abstract: | For recent years, many list companies have cheated in their financial statements so that people pay attention to these affairs. This paper uses the knowledge of game theory to analyze the benefit distribution of china securities regulatory commission and listed company. Confirms the response functions of them and supervise model. At last, it draws the conclusion that we can reduce the financial fraud by enhance the penalty to listed company and the stochastic inspection probability of china securities regulatory. |
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| Keywords: | game theory listed company equilibrium probability financial information. |
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