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基于供应链视角的并购谈判框架
引用本文:苏秦,刘强.基于供应链视角的并购谈判框架[J].管理科学学报,2012(1):77-86.
作者姓名:苏秦  刘强
作者单位:西安交通大学管理学院;机械制造系统国家重点实验室
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091);高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)
摘    要:在基于利润分配的供应链多边谈判环境中,探讨了买方与部分供应商并购的谈判框架.首先,分析了买方与单个供应商并购的情形.结果给出两种框架下各方所获利润,并进一步给出未参与并购的供应商互动下的均衡.其次,分析了买方与多个供应商并购的谈判框架.在买方与多个供应商同时并购和依次并购两种情形下,结果分别给出三种不同框架下各方所获利润.结论表明,并购过程中的供应链网络结构和相关企业互动削弱了并购协同下的买方利润,从而企业应谨慎选取并购战略及其分析框架以实现并购的战略目标.

关 键 词:并购  供应链  多边谈判  合作博弈

Negotiation frameworks of merger and acquisition in supply chains
SU Qin,LIU Qiang.Negotiation frameworks of merger and acquisition in supply chains[J].Journal of Management Sciences in China,2012(1):77-86.
Authors:SU Qin  LIU Qiang
Institution:School of Management,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China; State Key Laboratory for Manufacturing Systems Engineering,Xi’an 710049,China; The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Control & Efficiency Engineering,Xi’an 710049,China
Abstract:The negotiation frameworks of mergers and acquisitions(M&As) between a buyer and some of the suppliers are discussed in the environment of supply chain multilateral negotiations based on profit distribution.First,the cases of M&As between the buyer and a single supplier are analyzed.The result give each party’s profit in the two frameworks,and further gives the equilibriums under the interactions of suppliers who do not participate in M&As.Next,the frameworks of negotiations between the buyer and many suppliers are analyzed.In two cases of simultaneous and sequential M&As,the results give each party’s profits in three different frameworks respectively.It is illustrated that during the process of M&As the network structure of the supply chain under M&As and the interactions between relative firms undermines the buyer’s profit under M&A synergy,and therefore firms should carefully choose M&A strategy and its analytical framework to achieve the M&A’s strategic goal.
Keywords:M&A  supply chain  multilateral negotiation  cooperative game
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