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外包联盟中核心技术投入的激励机制研究
引用本文:杨东,李垣. 外包联盟中核心技术投入的激励机制研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2010, 24(1): 1-4
作者姓名:杨东  李垣
作者单位:西安电子科技大学经济管理学院,陕西,西安,710071;西安交通大学管理学院,陕西,西安,710049
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目 
摘    要:发包方如何设置有效的契约来激励接包方进行知识共享和核心技术的投入是外包联盟成功的关键。基于多任务委托代理模型,引入外包联盟的整体绩效作为绩效测量,进而将接包方的收益与绩效挂钩,激励接包方投入核心技术。通过分析,发现核心技术成本的临界值随着核心技术的贡献率的增大而降低,随着绩效测量误差的增大而增大。绩效测量误差还会负向影响接包方的激励系数以及发包方和接包方的效用。

关 键 词:外包  效用  委托代理  核心技术

Incentive Mechanism Research for Core Technology Input in Outsourcing Alliance
YANG Dong,LI Yuan. Incentive Mechanism Research for Core Technology Input in Outsourcing Alliance[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2010, 24(1): 1-4
Authors:YANG Dong  LI Yuan
Abstract:How to design contract of outsourcing party to encourage outsourced party to sharing knowledge and inputting core technology is the key in outsourcing alliance.Based on multi-task model,alliance performance regarded as performance measure,further,the benefit of outsourced party linking to performance measure so as to encourage it to input core technology.The threshold of cost of core technology decreases with the contribution rate of core technology increasing,whereas increases with the error of performance measure increasing.Further,the error of performance measure increasing will have an effect on the coefficient of incentive rate and utility of both outsourcing and outsourced party.
Keywords:outsourcing  utility  principal-agent  core technology
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