| 政府与农村信用社支农信贷的动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘雪冉.政府与农村信用社支农信贷的动态博弈分析[J].淮海工学院学报(社会科学版),2012,10(8):96-98. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘雪冉 |
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| 作者单位： | 郑州大学商学院,河南郑州,450001 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用动态博弈理论，通过构建动态博弈模型，分别从完全且完美信息动态博弈和完全但不完美信息动态博弈两个方面，分析了农村信用社与地方政府在支农贷款上的决策互动关系，并在分析的基础上得出了一些有益的启示。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府 农村信用社 支农贷款 动态博弈 |
Dynamic Game Analysis of Agricultural Credits Between Local Governments and Rural Credit Cooperatives |
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| LIU Xue-ran.Dynamic Game Analysis of Agricultural Credits Between Local Governments and Rural Credit Cooperatives[J].Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology,2012,10(8):96-98. |
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| Authors: | LIU Xue-ran |
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| Institution: | LIU Xue-ran(School of Business,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China) |
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| Abstract: | With the use of dynamic game and dynamic game model,the paper deals with the complete and perfect information dynamic game and the complete but imperfect information dynamic game,analyzes the interactive decision-making between local governments and rural credit cooperatives and proposes some suggestions. |
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| Keywords: | governments rural credit cooperatives agricultural credits dynamic game |
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