| 信息不对称、股东期望差异与企业家选择行为 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 杨沂,李竟成. 信息不对称、股东期望差异与企业家选择行为[J]. 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2008, 10(2): 29-34 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 杨沂 李竟成 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 西北大学,经济管理学院,西安,710069;南京工程学院,经济管理学院,南京,211167 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 主流经济学认为企业家是股东雇佣的代理人。然而近几年来，企业家越来越关注其雇主——股东的构成，他们更喜欢那些对公司未来具有相似期望值的股东。文章所研究的就是在外部股东具有不同期望值的经济体中，企业家如何通过改变股权结构来实现自己的愿望。
|
| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 看涨期权 行权价格 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-3370(2008)02-0029-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-11-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-11-06 |
The Information Asymmetry, Shareholders' Expectation Discrepancies and Entrepreneurs' Selection Behaviors |
| |
| YANG Yi and LI Jing-cheng. The Information Asymmetry, Shareholders' Expectation Discrepancies and Entrepreneurs' Selection Behaviors[J]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition), 2008, 10(2): 29-34 |
| |
| Authors: | YANG Yi and LI Jing-cheng |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1.School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi'an 7100692.School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167 |
| |
| Abstract: | The mainstream economists generally believe that the entrepreneur is the agent whom the shareholder hires.However,in recently years,entrepreneurs attach more importance to shareholder's constitution,and they prefer shareholders who possess the similar expected value towards theirs companies.This paper studies how the entrepreneurs fulfill their desires through the structural adjustment of stockholders' rights in the economies in which exterior shareholders have discrepant expected value. |
| |
| Keywords: | information asymmetry call option exercise price |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》下载全文 |
