| 预期损失赔偿的悖论及其克服 |
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| 引用本文： | 张响珍,程礼龙.预期损失赔偿的悖论及其克服[J].长江大学学报(社会科学版),2006,29(5):56-59. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张响珍 程礼龙 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 长江大学,外国语学院,湖北,荆州,434023
2. 长江大学,教育技术与服务中心,湖北,荆州,434023 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用经济学原理,从预防违约和信任投资两个方面对预期损失赔偿进行研究,认为这一制度蕴含着一个悖论:它不能同时实现合同双方当事人的社会效率,不能同时实现一方作出承诺时的有效预防与另一方作出反应时的有效信任。采取锁定赔偿额度,以完全预期损失赔偿替代预期损失赔偿可以克服这一悖论。
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| 关 键 词： | 预期损失赔偿 预防投入 信任投入 私人效率 社会效率 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-1395(2006)05-0056-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年5月20日 |
The Antinomy and Its Solution in Expected Loss Compensation |
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| ZHANG Xiang-zhen,CHENG Li-long.The Antinomy and Its Solution in Expected Loss Compensation[J].Journal of Yangtze University:Social Sciences,2006,29(5):56-59. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xiang-zhen CHENG Li-long |
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| Abstract: | According as the principles of economics,the system of expected loss compensation is studied from two angles,namely,prevention of breaching a contract and credit investment.There is an antinomy in this system.It can not realize the community efficiency of the cost of both sides,and it can not realize the effective prevention of the promiser and effective trust of the promisee simultaneously.The antinomy can be overcome by fixing the compensation amount and replacing expected loss compensation with full expected loss compensation. |
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| Keywords: | expected loss compensation prevention devotion trust devotion private efficiency society efficiency |
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