The social control of big business

Viewed from a conflict perspective, governmental agencies are tools of power and privilege. Subservient to powerful economic interest groups, regulatory agencies are claimed to exercise little, if any, effective control over the activities of big business.

Four hypotheses derived from a conflict perspective on the social control of big business are set forth: (1) less social control is exercised over big business than small business; (2) since the onset of the consumer movement, big business has been more frequently sanctioned; (3) over time big business “captures” regulatory agencies which results in a general decrease in the percentage of social control efforts directed toward big business; and (4) when big business is sanctioned, the smaller, less powerful of those businesses are sanctioned.

In this study the pattern of sanctioning of big business by a major federal regulatory agency is examined. Specifically, data on the issuance of cease and desist orders to business enterprises by the Federal Trade Commission over a twenty‐three year span of time are analyzed. The implications of the findings for each of the four hypotheses and for conflict theory in general are discussed.