Responsibility and sociological discourse

This article reads Chaim Perelman's theory of argumentation in order to formulate the task of social theorizing as responsible discourse. Taking rationality as sound argument which proceeds in terms of a link between speaker's intentions (the audience) and the public, the first part examines Perelman's notions about the relativity of facts to particular traditions of communication which link speakers, argumentation, and publics. Accepting that this view, shared by many sociologists, allows for no general criterion of rationality to be used as a principle for responsible speaking, the second part discusses how a choice for one or another tradition of reasoning in sociology might responsibly be made. This criterion for choosing is presented in terms of the relative generality and breadth of intended audiences and the relative openness to criticism of traditions of discourse.Preparation of this paper was assisted by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Leave Fellowship No. 451-801455, and the kind hospitality of lain Mangham and the Centre for the Study of Organizational Change and Development, University of Bath. Lloyd Bitzer, Joan Budge, Bob Hollinger, Valerie Sloane, Steve Turner and an anonymous, supportive referee have all helped me shape this essay. My gratitude for their assistance does not imply responsibility for the remaining faults and infelicities; that is mine.