DO STATES FREE RIDE IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT? |
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| Authors: | ROBERT M FEINBERG THOMAS A HUSTED |
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| Institution: | 1. Feinberg: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington DC 20016. Phone 202‐885‐3788, Fax 202‐885‐3790, E‐mail feinber@american.edu;2. Husted: Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington DC 20016. Phone 202‐885‐3773, Fax 202‐885‐3790, E‐mail husted@american.edu |
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| Abstract: | Recent research has documented a substantial role in antitrust enforcement by U.S. states. While many of the cases litigated involve small local firms, a nontrivial portion encompasses multiple‐state issues. Some previous literature has investigated whether states engage in free‐riding behavior in environmental regulation, and whether governments free ride on private decisions in provision of public goods. In this paper, we analyze a sample of antitrust cases involving cross‐state impacts (from the Multi‐State Antitrust Database, provided by the National Association of Attorneys General) and explain the determinants of free riding (which we define as participating in a case, but not as a lead plaintiff). (JEL L40, H41, H77) |
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