控制权、现金流权与公司价值——基于企业生命周期的视角

本文以2005-2008年间我国752家上市公司为样本,借鉴现金流组合方法对上市公司所处生命周期进行界定,从企业生命周期的角度考察了不同性质的最终控制人控制权、现金流权及两权分离程度对公司价值的影响。研究发现,最终控制人控制权与公司价值负相关;而现金流权也与公司价值负相关,这与西方学者结论不同,主要是因为我国特殊的股权结构--第一大股东持有的股份多数为非流通股,导致了高现金流权并不能起到相应的激励作用;两权分离程度在成长期和成熟期越大会造成公司价值的降低,而在衰退期则有利于公司价值的提升;最终控制人为非国有性质的公司,相对于国有性质的公司在成长期和成熟期更有利于公司价值的提升,而衰退期则相反。

Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights and Corporate Value: Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle

The paper presents an empirical study based on a database of 752 listed companies from 2005 to 2008 in China.With the method of cash flow portfolio to classify the phases of enter prises.life cycle,this paper investig ates the ultimate controllers.control rights,cash flow rights,the deviation of these two rights and their influence on corporate value.The results show that control rights of ultimate controller have a negative effect on corporate value.However,cash flow rights also have a negative effect,which is different for conclusions of western scholars.This is mainly because of our unique ownership structure,the shares held by major shareholders which are non-tradable shares,which result that high cash flow rights can not play a role in the incentive.The difference of two rights has a negative effect on corporate value in growing stage and maturity stage,while the decline stage is opposite.Comparing with non-state-owned companies,the state-owned companies have a better effect on the corporate value,while the opposite is true in recession.