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风险投资中的信息不对称与双边道德风险
引用本文:柯健. 风险投资中的信息不对称与双边道德风险[J]. 延安大学学报(社会科学版), 2009, 31(4): 42-48
作者姓名:柯健
作者单位:中共江西省委党校经济学教研部,江西 南昌,330003
摘    要:在风险投资过程中,存在着双边道德风险问题。在信息不对称情形下风险投资家与创业企业家同样面临双边道德风险。通过建立数学模型可以将信息结构与双边道德风险的关联进行量化分析,风险投资家投资价值的实现最终要依赖于创业企业的成功。通过合理的契约设计使契约在不同的利益分享机制下约束契约交易双方的风险行为。相机性控制权安排与可转换证券相结合,才能更好的解决风险投资中的双边道德风险问题。

关 键 词:风险投资  信息不对称  双边道德风险

The Risk of Investment in Information Asymmetry and Bilateral Moral Hazard
KE JIAN. The Risk of Investment in Information Asymmetry and Bilateral Moral Hazard[J]. Journal of Yan'an University (Social Science Edition), 2009, 31(4): 42-48
Authors:KE JIAN
Affiliation:KE JIAN (Economics Teaching and Research Department, Party School of CPC Jiangxi Provincial Committee, Nanchang 330003, Jiangxi)
Abstract:In the venture capital process, there is a bilateral problem of moral hazard. Information asymmetry in the case of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs face the same bilateral moral hazard. Through the establishment of mathematical model of information structure can be the risk of moral hazard and the associated bilateral quantitative analysis, venture capital investment to achieve the ultimate value depends on the success of start - ups. Contract through the rational design of contracts in different benefit - sharing mechanism under the contract bound the risk of trading conduct on both sides. The right to control the camera with a combination of convertible securities in order to better address the risk of bilateral investment problem of moral hazard.
Keywords:risk investment  information asymmetry  bilateral moral hazard
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