再制造逆向供应链协调的奖励与奖惩机制设计

设计了政府的奖惩机制,建立了7种情形的决策模型,研究了5种情形下激励机制对于引导回收商提高回收量的有效性。结果表明:制造商对于回收商的奖惩机制不能有效协调逆向供应链;政府对于回收商或制造商的奖励机制均能有效协调逆向供应链且效果相同;政府无论给予制造商还是回收商奖惩机制均能有效协调逆向供应链;政府给予制造商比给予回收商奖惩机制更能调动制造商和回收商的积极性;奖惩机制与奖励机制在引导回收商与制造商的作用方面相似,两种机制下的均衡价格相同,但受到奖惩机制的回收商或制造商的利润与奖励机制相比有所减少,减少量与奖惩力度成正比。

Design of the Premium Mechanism and the Premium and Penalty Mechanism for the Remanufacturing Reverse Supply Chain Coordination

This paper designs the premium and penalty mechanisms,establishes seven different decision structure models,and studies the validity of incentive mechanism for leading the collector to increase its collection quantity in five cases. The results show that it is of no effect for the manufacturer offering the collector premium and penalty mechanism;however,the premium mechanism offered by the government to the manufacturer or the collector can coordinate the reverse supply chain. Furthermore,it is as efficient for the government offering the manufacturer premium mechanism as offering the collector the mechanism. The premium and penalty mechanism offered by the government to the manufacturer or the collector can coordinate the reverse supply chain. It is more efficient for the government offering them premium mechanism than the premium and penalty mechanism,sine the former is valid for increasing both the manufacturer and the collector's enthusiasm. The premium and penalty mechanism is similar to the premium mechanism in leading the collector and the manufacturer. The prices are the same under both mechanisms;ho wever,the profit of the manufacturer or the collector from the premium and penalty mechanism decreases, and the decreasing quantity is in proportion to the premium and penalty degree.